/ Occupation of the Ruhr
The true content of this diplomatic document became clear the very next day. On January 11, 1923, detachments of the Franco-Belgian troops of several thousand people occupied Essen and its environs. A state of siege was declared in the city. The German government responded to these measures by telegraphing its ambassador Mayer from Paris and his envoy Landsberg from Brussels. All German diplomatic representatives abroad were instructed to explain in detail to the respective governments all the circumstances of the case and to protest against "the violent policy of France and Belgium, contrary to international law." President Ebert's proclamation "To the German People" of January 11 also announced the need for protest "against the violence against law and the peace treaty." The formal protest of Germany was announced on January 12, 1923, in the response of the German government to the Belgian and French note. “The French government,” read the German note, “is trying in vain to disguise a serious breach of the treaty by giving a peaceful explanation for its actions. The fact that the army crosses the border of the unoccupied German territory in wartime composition and weapons characterizes the actions of France as a military action.
“This is not about reparations,” said Chancellor Cuno in a speech to the Reichstag on January 13. “This is an old goal that has been set by French policy for more than 400 years ... This policy was most successfully pursued by Louis XIV and Napoleon I; but other rulers of France have adhered to it no less clearly to the present day.
British diplomacy continued to outwardly remain an indifferent witness to the developing events. She assured France of her loyalty.
But behind the diplomatic scenes, England was preparing the defeat of France. D "Abernon conducted continuous negotiations with the German government about methods of fighting against the occupation.
The German government was advised to respond to the French policy of occupying the Ruhr with "passive resistance". The latter was to be expressed in the organization of the struggle against the use by France of the economic wealth of the Ruhr, as well as in the sabotage of the activities of the occupation authorities.
The initiative in pursuing this policy came from Anglo-American circles. d "Abernon himself strongly attributes it to American influence. "In the post-war development of Germany, American influence was decisive," he says. "Remove the actions taken on American advice,
either in supposed agreement with American opinion, or in anticipation of American approval, and the whole course of German policy would have been quite different.
As far as English diplomacy is concerned, as the facts show, it not only had no real intention to keep Poincaré from the Ruhr adventure, but secretly sought to kindle a Franco-German conflict. Curzon only for appearances made his demarches against the occupation of the Ruhr; in fact, he did nothing to prevent its implementation. Moreover, both Curzon and his agent, the English ambassador in Berlin, Lord d "Abernon, believed that the Ruhr conflict could mutually weaken both France and Germany. And this would lead to the dominance of Great Britain in the arena of European politics.
The Soviet government took a completely independent position on the question of the occupation of the Ruhr.
Openly condemning the capture of the Ruhr, the Soviet government warned that this act not only could not lead to the stabilization of the international situation, but clearly threatened with a new European war. The Soviet government understood that the Ruhr occupation was as much the result of Poincaré's aggressive policy as it was the fruit of the provocative actions of the German imperialist bourgeoisie, led by the German "People's Party" of Stinnes. Warning the peoples of the whole world that this dangerous game could end in a new military conflagration, the Soviet government, in its appeal to the Central Executive Committee of January 13, 1923, expressed its sympathy for the German proletariat, which was becoming the first victim of the provocative policy of catastrophes pursued by the German imperialists.
The Versailles agreements put Germany in an extremely difficult position. The armed forces of the country were sharply limited. The winners divided the German colonies among themselves, and the bloodless German economy could now rely only on those raw materials that were available on its greatly reduced territory. The country had to pay large reparations.
On January 30, 1921, the conference of the Entente countries and Germany completed its work in Paris, setting the total amount of German reparations at 226 billion gold marks, which must be paid over 42 years. On March 3, the corresponding ultimatum was delivered to the German Foreign Minister. It contained a requirement within 4 days to fulfill its conditions. On March 8, having received no response to the ultimatum, the Entente troops occupied Duisburg, Ruhrort and Düsseldorf; at the same time, economic sanctions were imposed on Germany.
On May 5, the Entente countries presented Germany with a new ultimatum demanding that they accept all new proposals of the reparation commission within 6 days (pay 132 billion marks over 66 years, including 1 billion immediately) and fulfill all the conditions of the Versailles Treaty on disarmament and the extradition of the perpetrators of the world war. wars; otherwise, the Allied forces threatened to completely occupy the Ruhr area. On May 11, 1921, the office of Chancellor Wirth, two hours before the expiration of the ultimatum, accepted the conditions of the Allies. But only on September 30, French troops were withdrawn from the Ruhr. However, Paris did not stop thinking about this rich region.
The volume of reparations turned out to be beyond Germany's strength. Already in the autumn of 1922, the German government turned to the allies with a request for a moratorium on the payment of reparations. But the French government headed by Poincaré refused. In December, the head of the Rhenish-Westphalian coal syndicate, Stinnes, refused to deliver on reparations, even under the threat of being occupied by the troops of the Ruhr Entente. On January 11, 1923, a 100,000-strong Franco-Belgian contingent occupied the Ruhr and the Rhineland.
The Ruhr (after Upper Silesia was taken from Germany under the Treaty of Versailles) gave the country about 80% of coal, more than half of German metallurgy was concentrated here. The struggle for the Ruhr area united the German nation. The government called for passive resistance, which, however, began without any calls. In the Ruhr, enterprises stopped working, transport and mail did not work, taxes were not paid. With the support of the army, partisan actions and sabotage unfolded. The French responded with arrests, deportations, and even death sentences. But this did not change the situation.
The loss of the Ruhr led to an aggravation of the economic crisis throughout the country. Due to the lack of raw materials, thousands of enterprises stopped working, unemployment increased, wages decreased, inflation increased: by November 1923, 1 gold mark was worth 100 billion paper. The Weimar Republic was shattered. On September 26, Chancellor Stresemann announced the end of passive resistance in the Ruhr area and the resumption of German reparations payments. On the same day, a state of emergency was declared. The refusal to resist the French activated right and left extremists, as well as separatists, in many areas of Germany. The Communists blamed the occupation of the Ruhr on the government and called for civil disobedience and a general strike. With the help of the Reichswehr, the uprisings were nipped in the bud, although there was some bloodshed: in Hamburg, it came to barricade battles. In November 1923 the Communist Party was officially banned. On November 8-9, 1923, an attempted coup took place in Munich, which was organized by a little-known right-wing organization - the NSDAP.
From September 26, 1923 to February 1924, Minister of Defense Gessler and General von Seeckt, head of the Land Forces of the Reichswehr, were vested with exclusive powers in Germany in accordance with the state of emergency. These powers in practice made the general and the army dictators of the Reich.
Great Britain and the United States were dissatisfied with the intransigent position of France and insisted on negotiating over the establishment of a more realistic amount of reparations. On November 29 in London, the reparations commission set up two expert committees to study the question of stabilizing the German economy and ensuring that it paid reparations. On August 16, 1924, the conference of the countries of Europe, the USA and Japan completed its work there, adopting a new reparation plan of the American banker Charles Dawes.
In accordance with the Dawes Plan, France and Belgium evacuated troops from the Ruhr area (they began to do this on August 18, 1924 and finished a year later). A rolling payment schedule was established (which gradually increased from 1 billion marks in 1924 to 2.5 billion marks in 1928–1929). The main source of covering reparations was assumed to be state budget revenues from high indirect taxes on consumer goods, transport and customs fees. The plan made the German economy dependent on American capital. The country was given 800 million marks as a loan from the United States to stabilize the currency. The plan was based on the fact that German industrialists and merchants would transfer their foreign economic activity to Eastern Europe. The adoption of the plan testified to the strengthening of US influence in Europe and the failure of France's attempt to establish its hegemony.
Reparations were to be paid both in goods and in cash in foreign currency. To ensure payments, it was planned to establish control of the Allies over the German state budget, money circulation and credit, and railways. Control was exercised by a special committee of experts headed by a general agent for reparations. Charles Dawes was called the savior of Europe, and in 1925 he received the Nobel Peace Prize.
On October 16, 1925, in the Swiss city of Locarno, an international conference completed its work, in which representatives of Great Britain, France, Belgium, Italy, Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia took part. The conference adopted the Rhine Pact, which ensured the inviolability of the borders between France, Belgium and Germany. The latter finally abandoned its claims to Alsace and Lorraine, and France - from its claims to the Ruhr region. The provisions of the Treaty of Versailles on the demilitarization of the Rhineland were confirmed and the Dawes plan was approved. By the way, the eastern German borders did not fall under the system of guarantees worked out in Locarno, which was part of the anti-Soviet policy of the powers.
The settlement of the reparations question and the elimination of the Ruhr conflict created favorable conditions for the influx of foreign capital into Germany. By September 1930, the amount of foreign, mainly American, investment in Germany amounted to 26-27 billion marks, and the total amount of German reparation payments for the same period was a little more than 10 billion marks. These capitals contributed to the restoration of industrial production in Germany, which already in 1927 reached the pre-war level.
Ruhr region
On January 10, 1923, a Franco-Belgian note was sent to Berlin. She notified the German government of violations by Germany of paragraphs 17 and 18 of the eighth section of the Treaty of Versailles. On January 11, 1923, the Franco-Belgian army began the occupation of the Ruhr. Germany withdrew its ambassadors from Paris and Brussels and protested. Chancellor V. Kuno's call for passive resistance meant non-violent resistance to the occupation, namely the sabotage of all activities of the occupation authorities and the cessation of coal supplies. At the same time, the Ruhr crisis caused a new wave of revanchism in Germany.
The government of R. Poincare expanded the area of occupation of Germany and she lost 88% of coal, 48% of iron, 70% of cast iron. Only in the autumn of 1923 Germany abandoned the policy of passive resistance. Under pressure from Britain and the United States, France began the early evacuation of troops from the territory of the left bank of the Rhine. To ensure its security in the new conditions, France built a fortified defensive line along the Franco-German border. It was called the "Maginot Line" after its initiator, Minister of War A. Maginot.
The events of the Ruhr crisis of 1923 significantly changed the balance of power among the major powers in Europe. Britain and the United States put forward their own version of the solution of the reparations problem, which provided for the stabilization of the economic and political situation in Germany.
Dawes plan to resolve the reparations issue
Within the framework of the reparations commission, an international committee of experts was set up to propose methods for balancing Germany's budget, stabilizing its currency, and providing a stronger basis for its reparations. The committee was headed by the director of a large Chicago bank, Charles Dawes (Morgan's banking group). In a message to Congress dated December 6, 1923, the new President K. Coolidge emphasized the obligations of the United States to provide assistance to Europe in order to ensure the receipt of European debts, which, together with interest, amounted to $ 7,200 million. At the same time, German Foreign Minister G. Stresemann told the British Ambassador Lord E. d'Abernon about the need for Germany to participate in the work of the reparation commission as an equal partner. He also demanded firm promises to withdraw troops from German territory.
At the London Special Conference of the Allied Powers (July-August 1924), the experts' report, the "Dawes Plan", was approved. On August 16, an agreement was signed between the German government and the reparation commission. The main objective of the plan was to actually ensure the payment of reparations by Germany. To do this, she was given a large international loan in the amount of 800 million gold marks. These funds were directed to the restoration of the German economy, and, above all, to heavy industry and the stabilization of the financial system.
The Dawes Plan did not fix the total amount of reparations and the deadline for payments. Annual payment amounts were set, but they were significantly reduced until the completion of the economic recovery process. It was assumed that during the first year they would amount to 1 billion marks, then they would gradually increase and, having reached 2.5 billion marks by the financial year 1928-1929, they would stabilize at this level.
The sources of reparations payments were more clearly defined: deductions from the profits of German railways and industry, paid in the form of interest on specially issued bonds. Also, reparations were covered by the state budget. To this end, the imposition of high indirect taxes on consumer goods (sugar, tobacco, beer, fabrics, shoes) was envisaged, as a result of which the burden of reparations was placed mainly on the population of Germany.
The entire financial system of Germany was placed under the control of the Allied Powers, but the control over the German military industry and the national economy, established by the Treaty of Versailles, was abolished. The conference rejected France's method of independently resolving the reparations issue and recognized that conflict issues should be resolved by an arbitration commission headed by US representatives. French troops were withdrawn from the Ruhr basin for one year, economic sanctions were immediately lifted from the Rhineland.
Thus, the key to solving the problem of reparations and European debts was the Dawes plan, the adoption of which changed the balance of power in the international arena. First of all, there was a strengthening of the position of the United States. Thanks to reparations from Germany, England, France and other European countries began to regularly pay war debts to the United States. A broad stream of loans ensured American capital a dominant position in Germany and then financial hegemony in Western Europe.
The implementation of the reparation plan brought considerable financial benefits to German capital. Large foreign loans, the conclusion of profitable trade agreements made it possible to stabilize the German mark and not only quickly restore economic potential, but also modernize and develop Germany's industry. Already in 1927, German exports exceeded the pre-war level. At the end of the 1920s, the problem of new sales markets and sources of raw materials became acute. The economic strengthening of Germany contributed to the strengthening of its foreign policy positions, which inevitably led to a change in the balance of power in the world system that had developed as a result of the First World War.
Until the end of 1922 Germany paid, according to the reparation commission, 1.7 billion marks in gold and about 3.7 billion in kind. Of this amount, England received 1.1 billion, and France - 1.7 billion. The amount of actual payments made far lagged behind reparation obligations. Germany constantly demanded a moratorium and, deliberately creating inflation, shied away from its obligations in every possible way. The Poincare government saw the only way out of the situation in exerting forceful pressure on Germany by occupying the Ruhr area. England opposed these intentions and thus actively encouraged the Germans to resist. While Poincaré demanded effective guarantees for the payment of reparations, England insisted on granting a moratorium to Germany. The British representative on the reparations commission came to Berlin on purpose in November 1922 and insistently advised the German government to stand firmly in favor of granting a moratorium. Many British leaders deliberately provoked the Germans to oppose the payment of reparations, hoping to provoke a crisis in which France would be defeated and lose its significance in European politics. This made the occupation of the Ruhr inevitable.
On the other hand, British politicians were inclined to welcome the Ruhr crisis, hoping that it would eliminate the tendencies in Germany towards a separate agreement with France and make England ready to enter as an arbiter. Not unimportant in Lloyd George's plans was the involvement of the United States in European affairs, in particular, in financing Germany to pay payments and link its own debt to them. British diplomacy provoked the Ruhr conflict, not fully understanding the diplomatic game of the French.
France sought not only the payment of payments by Germany, but above all the establishment of the hegemony of French industry in Europe. It was about the connection of the coal and metallurgical industries of France and Germany. France needed coal, Germany was short of iron ore. Even before 1914, some Ruhr companies bought iron ore plants in France, and French iron and steel companies bought Ruhr coal mines. The largest German industrialist Hugo Stinnes in 1922 intensively looked for the possibility of creating a Franco-German cartel of coal and steel.24 The Ruhr occupation, with the participation of 5 French divisions and one Belgian division, had as its main goal to achieve the integration of these two key industries under French control. The assertions of French diplomats about security and reparations were only an additional argument to justify this act. In addition, the French ruling circles planned the dismemberment of Germany. The occupation was to end with the annexation of the left bank of the Rhine and the Ruhr region to France, the separation of southern Germany from northern Germany, the inclusion of the dismembered Reich in the sphere of French hegemony on the European continent.
The French occupation area covered an area 96 km deep and 45 km wide. But in this small area, 80-85% of all German coal production, 80% of iron and steel production and 10% of the country's population were concentrated. Shortly before the French intervention in Germany, a center-right government came to power, consisting of the German People's Party led by Stresemann, representatives of the Catholic center, etc. The government was headed by a representative of German big business, Wilhelm Kuno (1876-1933), who had extensive business connections in the USA and England.
The Kuno government, counting on the support of the United States and England, called on all employees, workers and entrepreneurs to refuse any cooperation with the occupying forces and stopped paying reparations altogether. It was a policy of passive resistance. All political parties supported her. The French occupation authorities began to evict from the Rhineland all government officials who took part in acts of sabotage. Only 100 thousand workers and employees were evicted. The French began to send their own transport engineers and miners. The burden of intervention grew rapidly on the French budget. At the same time, the occupation of the Ruhr and passive resistance led to the collapse of the German mark and the German economy was on the verge of complete ruin. The time came when the Berlin government could not find the money to ensure the passive resistance of the Ruhr population.
Anxiety grew in England over the French occupation of the Ruhr. English diplomats feared that, if France succeeded, she would be in a position similar to that which she had held after the Peace of Tilsit. The support provided by England to Germany became more active. British diplomats encouraged the Germans to continue resisting, advising them to hold out until the financial pressure on France from England and the United States took its toll. At the same time, England did nothing real in material support of the German resistance. The leader of the German People's Party Gustav Stresemann (1878-1929) wrote in his memoirs: "We have been warned from the confidential sources of this country (i.e. England) that the conflict could last for months and that we must hold out. The latest news from America allows to assume that America is inclined to participate in actions against France, in any case, in financial measures calculated to lower the franc "25. British diplomats deceived the Germans. They did not care about the German fate, it was important that France suffered economic damage and suffered a political defeat. The exhausted Germans, the half-starved city dwellers of the Ruhr, had to play the role of a vanguard in the English anti-French struggle. The Germans once again succumbed to the bait of the British and there is no doubt that without the inspiring promises of England, the "passive resistance" of the Germans would not have lasted long and would not have brought any effect.
Whenever it seemed that the policy of passive resistance was beginning to weaken, and the shadow of a political and economic crisis hung over Germany, British diplomacy began to act especially actively. On August 11, 1923, Lord Curzon, the British Foreign Secretary, in a note published in the press, sharply condemned the Ruhr policy of France and threatened separate action if France did not agree with Germany. The note stated that England "cannot advise Germany to stop passive resistance." This was an attempt by England to directly intervene in the conflict and at the same time encourage those circles of the German bourgeoisie who not only did not suffer from "passive resistance", but also received substantial compensation from the government in the form of subsidies for downtime of enterprises.
But Poincaré ignored Curzon's note and demanded unconditional surrender from the German government. Germany had no choice. In August 1923, the Reichsbank did not even have depreciated stamps to pay for passive resistance. The crisis in the country deepened every day. The political situation became extremely tense. On August 12, 1923, the Kuno government fell and on August 13, Gustav Stresemann formed a "grand coalition" government, which included the Social Democrats, the Center Party, and others. The new government headed for an agreement with the French. This decision was hastened by the announcement of a general strike in Germany. A separatist movement began in the country. In the western lands, the creation of the Rhine Republic was announced, which was announced in Cologne by the burgomaster of the city, Konrad von Adenauer. The collapse of the state was brewing. On September 27, the government announced an end to passive resistance. Stresemann explained this act of the German government, first of all, by fear of a social upheaval. He wrote on October 10: "We stopped passive resistance because it completely exploded by itself and would only plunge us into Bolshevism if we continued to finance it"26.
The political situation was tense to the limit. Separatist uprisings took place in Koblenz, Wiesbaden, Trier, Mainz, and a republic with its own armed forces was proclaimed in northern Bavaria. The French occupation authorities recognized "de facto" the governments of these "republics". In Saxony and Thuringia, as a result of local elections, coalition governments consisting of communists and socialists came to power. On October 22-24, a popular uprising took place in Hamburg, led by the leader of the Communists of the city, Ernst Thalmann, the future chairman of the Communist Party of Germany. In Saxony and Thuringia, "Red Hundreds" were created, which are armed revolutionary detachments. A fascist coup began in Munich and a fascist organization led by Adolf Hitler began a march on Berlin on November 8, 1923. In fact, a civil war began in the country on the principle of "war of all against all." It was necessary to urgently take measures to save the German state. On September 27, Stresemann announced the end of passive resistance. This was a tactical ploy by the German politicians, who hoped that such a move would lead to negotiations with the French government and reparations and the withdrawal of troops from the Ruhr.
But the French government, taught by the bitter experience of the attitude of the Germans to the problem of reparations, refused even to talk about the Rhineland, Ruhr and reparations. It declared that France needed certain guarantees, which could only be guaranteed by the obligations of the Ruhr industrialists. The Ruhr magnates were forced to make an agreement with the French military authorities. They feared that the French occupation of the Ruhr might turn into permanent French control in western Germany, over the industry of the Ruhr and the Rhineland. The Stresemann government allowed the Ruhr industrialists to start negotiations with the French authorities on the issue of industrial production and payment of reparations. It promised to reimburse their expenses later, when foreign credits were available. On November 23, a comprehensive agreement was concluded with the occupation authorities, according to which the German industrialists guaranteed deliveries of reparations and timely payment of monetary contributions. Poincare won, the German government abandoned passive resistance and accepted the conditions of France. But much more important was England's refusal to confront France jointly with Germany. On September 20, 1923, after a meeting between British Prime Minister S. Baldwin and Poincaré, a communiqué was adopted stating that both sides "were happy to establish a common agreement in their views and find that in no other issue there is such a disagreement about the goals and principles that would hinder cooperation between the two countries, cooperation on which peace and harmony all over the world depend so much.
Germany once again received an object lesson from the diplomats of the "island of the Pharisees", as the great English writer Galsworthy called England. England provoked the Ruhr crisis, drove Germany to economic collapse and betrayed her as soon as it became clear that France intended to carry out her Ruhr policy to the end. France won economically and politically. She showed that she would have to be reckoned with, whether England liked it or not. She has enough power resources to force Germany to fulfill its obligations under the Treaty of Versailles. Germany capitulated, she had to change tactics. The main hopes were pinned on the United States and the development of a new eastern policy, the basis of which was relations with the Soviet Union. England was given the opportunity to isolate France through an agreement with the United States and Germany.
As early as March 1921, the French occupied Duisburg and Düsseldorf in the Rhine demilitarized zone. This allowed France to open the way for further occupation of the entire industrial area, in addition, since the French now had control of the ports of Duisburg, they knew exactly the volume of exports of coal, steel and other products. They were not satisfied with the way Germany fulfilled its obligations. In May, the London ultimatum was put forward, according to which a schedule was set for the payment of reparations in the amount of 132 billion gold marks; in case of non-fulfilment, Germany was threatened with the occupation of the Ruhr.
Administered and occupied territories of Germany. 1923
Then the Weimar Republic went the way of the "policy of execution" - to follow the requirements so that their impracticability became obvious. Germany was weakened by the war, the economy was in ruins, inflation was rising, the country was trying to convince the winners that their appetites were too high. In 1922, seeing the deterioration in the economy of the Weimar Republic, the allies agreed to replace cash payments with natural ones - wood, steel, coal. But in January 1923, the International Reparations Commission stated that Germany was deliberately delaying deliveries. In 1922, instead of the required 13.8 million tons of coal - only 11.7 million tons, and instead of 200,000 telegraph masts - only 65,000. This was the reason for France to send troops into the Ruhr basin.
Caricature of Germany paying reparations
Even on the eve of the entry of troops on January 11 into Essen and its environs, large industrialists left the city. Immediately after the start of the occupation, the German government recalled its ambassadors from Paris and Brussels, the invasion was declared "contrary to international law, the violent policy of France and Belgium." Germany accused France of violating the treaty, declared a "war crime". Britain chose to remain outwardly indifferent, meanwhile convincing the French of her loyalty. In fact, England hoped to push Germany and France against each other, eliminate them and become a political leader in Europe. It was the British and Americans who advised the Weimar Republic to pursue a policy of "passive resistance" - to fight against France's use of the economic wealth of the Ruhr, to sabotage the activities of the occupation authorities. Meanwhile, the French and Belgians, starting with 60 thousand soldiers, brought their presence in the region to 100 thousand people and occupied the entire Ruhr region in 5 days. As a result, Germany lost almost 80% of coal and 50% of iron and steel.
Hyperinflation in Germany
While the British played their game behind the scenes, the Soviet government was seriously concerned about the situation. They said that the escalation of tension in the region could provoke a new European war. The Soviet government blamed both the aggressive policy of Poincaré and the provocative actions of the German imperialists for the conflict.
Meanwhile, on January 13, the German government adopted the concept of passive resistance by a majority vote. The payment of reparations was stopped, Ruhr enterprises and departments openly refused to obey the demands of the invaders, general strikes took place in factories, transport and state institutions. Communists and former members of voluntary paramilitary patriotic groups staged acts of sabotage and attacks on Franco-Belgian troops. Resistance in the region grew, it was expressed even in the language - all borrowed words from French were replaced by German synonyms. Nationalist and revanchist sentiments intensified, fascist-type organizations were secretly formed in all areas of the Weimar Republic, and the Reichswehr was close to them, whose influence in the country was gradually growing. They advocated the mobilization of forces for the restoration, training and rearmament of the "great German army."
Protest against the occupation of the Ruhr, July 1923
In response, Poincaré strengthened the occupying army and banned the export of coal from the Ruhr to Germany. He hoped to achieve a status similar to the Saar region - when the territory formally belonged to Germany, but all power was in the hands of the French. The repressions of the occupying authorities intensified, a number of coal producers were arrested, and government officials were arrested. In order to intimidate, a show trial was held and the execution of Freikorps member Albert Leo Schlageter, who was accused of espionage and sabotage. The German government repeatedly expressed its protest, but Poincaré invariably replied that “all the measures taken by the occupation authorities are perfectly legitimate. They are a consequence of the violation of the Treaty of Versailles by the German government.”
French soldier in the Ruhr
Germany hoped for help from England, but the British gradually realized that further pouring oil on the fire could be dangerous for themselves. England expected that because of the occupation, the franc would fall and the pound would soar. Only they did not take into account that because of this, the Germans lost their solvency, the devastation in the German economy destabilized the European market, English exports fell, unemployment began to grow in Britain. In the last hope of helping the British, the German government on May 2 sent them and the governments of other countries a note with proposals for reparations. All issues were proposed to be resolved by an international commission. There was a new round of diplomatic skirmish. France strongly objected to accusations of violating the Treaty of Versailles and demanded an end to passive resistance. In June, Chancellor Cuno revised his proposals slightly and put forward the idea of determining Germany's ability to pay at an "impartial international conference."
Occupation troops
A month later, England expressed its readiness to put pressure on Germany so that she would give up resistance in the Ruhr, but on the condition that the solvency of the Weimar Republic be assessed and a more realistic amount of reparations be established. France again rejected any proposals, the world press started talking about a split in the Entente. Poincaré declared that the ruin of Germany was the work of Germany itself and the occupation of the Ruhr had nothing to do with it. The Germans must give up resistance without any conditions. It was obvious that both France and Germany wanted a speedy resolution to the conflict, but both sides were too proud to make concessions.
General Charles Dawes
Finally, on September 26, 1923, the new Chancellor Gustav Stresemann announced the end of passive resistance. Under pressure from the United States and Britain, France signed an allied agreement on a control commission for the factories and mines of the Ruhr. In 1924, a committee led by the American Charles Dawes drew up a new plan for Germany to pay reparations. The Weimar Republic was able to overcome inflation and gradually began to restore its economy. The victorious powers began to receive their payments and were able to return military loans received from the United States. In total, during the Ruhr conflict, the damage to the German economy amounted to 4 to 5 billion gold marks. In July-August 1925, the occupation of the Ruhr region ended.
